APEC remains an American project

But Russia’s biggest success was in its relations with Japan. The two countries signed an agreement on combating illegal fishing of marine biological resources in border areas, a contract on the construction of a wood chemical complex in the Krasnoyarsk Territory, and a memorandum of understanding between Gazprom and the Japanese Agency for Natural Resources and Energy on the Vladivostok LNG project. These agreements demonstrated some shifts in Japan’s position, which had since 1982 been dominated by "Nakasone’s doctrine,” which prescribed that the issue of the "Northern Territories” should be broached in all talks with the Kremlin. It was Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama (2009-2010) alone who suggested that the territorial dispute and economic relations should be separated. But at the time his proposals failed to find support within the Japanese establishment. Today, however, the Noda cabinet is returning to the "Hatoyama strategy.”

Nevertheless, these partial successes cannot hide the existence of a deep-seated problem. In Vladivostok, Russia failed to present its agenda for APEC. Over the last two years, Russian experts have written volumes about it being of crucial importance for Russia to put forward an economic project of its own in the Asia-Pacific region, be it on energy security in the Pacific zone, or on the "joint economic development” of the Russian Far East. These proposals were repeatedly announced by high-ranking officials, including ex-President Dmitry Medvedev.

But, for the time being, neither China nor the United States nor any other Pacific countries have shown any great interest in these ambitious projects. Washington and Beijing (and for that matter Tokyo and Seoul) would not mind being involved in the development of the Far Eastern resources, but they want to do it on their own terms, not Russia’s. At best, the Russian proposals went on to the back burner and at worst, the Asian Tigers were totally disinterested. Conscious of this possibility, the Russian leadership began, in spring 2012, to carefully downplay the originally ambitious agenda of the Vladivostok summit.

The crux of the matter is that APEC remains a U.S. project. As far back as 1989, Australia and New Zealand, with the support of the United States, succeeded in establishing APEC as a consultative forum lacking a rigid organizational structure. The forum was joined not only by the East Asian countries but also by all the Pacific countries that wanted to join.

In 1994, APEC announced its strategic goal, which was to establish by 2020 a common free-trade zone and a liberal investment regime in the Pacific.

Washington believed that APEC was a reliable tool for the "soft” containment of the People’s Republic of China, which could be used to block China’s attempts to phase out U.S. involvement in East Asian affairs. This APEC agenda is still a priority for Washington, even though since the end of 2011 the Obama administration has been shifting the focus to a new integration project, the Trans-Pacific Partnership.

Russia is in a dubious position. Moscow cannot sympathize with the U.S. goals in the Pacific. But APEC is the only integration union in the Pacific in which the Russian Federation has full-member status. Russia joined APEC – with U.S. help – in 1998, even though the leading Asian powers were against its accession. Washington saw it as a chance to balance out the Russian-Chinese rapprochement, signs of which started appearing in the mid-1990s. For Russia, however, it was the only opportunity to become directly involved in the regional processes in the Pacific.

Moscow has traditionally regarded APEC as a tool for attracting foreign investment. But the 1994 Bogor Goals put the Russian leadership on its guard.

First, it is economies rather than countries that are members of APEC. Members of the forum can, therefore, be entities with an uncertain status (Taiwan) or even individual regions (Hong Kong). Is there any guarantee that Russia’s Far Eastern regions will not seek to become individually represented in APEC?

Second, APEC’s strategic goal of foreign trade liberalization is likely to weaken the customs regulation system. It will be more difficult or problematic to control commodity flows to the Russian Far East, support Russia’s car manufacturers or iron-and-steel industry, to name just a few. The federal authorities will be unable to supervise migration policy and the border control system as efficiently as they did before.

Third, APEC’s idea of a "green economy” is about changing the energy balance within the Asia Pacific region. This is an unpleasant issue for Russia, because Moscow is planning to expand energy exports to East Asia, while the tipping of the energy balance will only reduce Russian resources.

The important thing for Russia in this context is to unobtrusively adjust APEC’s integration priorities. But Moscow failed to do this in Vladivostok. The final declaration of the summit confirmed the desire of the member economies to liberalize foreign trade in order to implement the Bogor Goals.

Even though the prospects for that are still vague, the declaration proves that the APEC agenda continues to be shaped by the United States and its allies, while the Kremlin has only a limited influence on the processes in the Pacific. The result of the Vladivostok summit is not fatal for Russia, but it does show how difficult it will be for Moscow to integrate into the Pacific system of relationships.