US-China relations and Russia’s choice

The rise of China and the relative decline of the role of the USA on the international arena demand de-ideologization of Russia’s view of the world. Political realism must be freed from the chains of outdated dogmas and from Russia’s ambitions to oppose the imaginary and abstract "West.”

Most experts agree that the Chinese economy will surpass the American economy in terms of absolute GDP within the next ten years. This change will occur under the watch of the current political administration in Beijing, which came to power in November 2012. In the meantime, the United States will remain the strongest power militarily and retain its preeminence in the spheres of science, education, technological development and innovations. Over time, we will enter a fundamentally new epoch of world history, characterized by diversification of leadership in various fields amongst a large number of countries. Does Russia have a foreign policy strategy which can prepare it for these international changes? And how should Russia react to the growing competition between the US and China today?  

Relations between Russia, China and the United States do not amount to a simple set of exchanges between influential and powerful states.  These relations are also characterized by a collision of self-definitions and varying interpretations of the outside world. Neither classical balance-of-power approaches to international relations (realism) nor varying degrees of democratic development (liberalism) are sufficient to fully explain the nature of these complex relationships. A constructivist approach, however, would allow us to address apparent paradoxes of these states’ foreign policies and take a look at the idiosyncrasies of their domestic discourses. This can, in turn, reveal differences in how these states form and formulate their national identities.

Russia’s perceptions of the West are closely intertwined with internal discourses about national identity and debates about Russia’s development pathways. Russia’s view on China, on the other hand, is far more removed from Russia’s perceptions of self, and is based rather on foreign policy and economic calculations. This asymmetry in perceptions of leading international actors influences Russia’s foreign policy in ways that hinder its adaptation to fundamental changes on the international arena. If Russia continues to craft its foreign policy as a function of its own existential search for an identity, Russia will run the risk of missing important opportunities and overlooking grave threats. The rise of a new brand of conservatism among Russia’s political elites is likely to follow this dangerous pattern and get in the way of developing realistic and flexible policies towards the US and China. 

Amongst Russian political elites we witness the paradoxical combination of an unwavering belief in the existence of a European (understood as Christian) civilization on the one hand, and anti-Western rhetoric on the other hand. While relations with the USA are constantly securitized, relations with China are usually formulated in pragmatic, rational terms. Rising anti-Western rhetoric in the Kremlin in 2012 contrasts sharply with the absence of any publicly expressed concern over China. Official documents and statements demonstrate an apparent indifference on the side of the Kremlin towards China’s military growth and its increasingly assertive foreign policy in 2008-2012.

Most Russians share the Kremlin’s visions of the United States and China.  According to an opinion poll conducted by the Levada Center in 2011, 29% of Russians who thought that their country had enemies considered this enemy to be the United States (the US came in second place in the list of enemies after Chechen militants).  China was named a potential adversary by a mere 9% of respondents. In 2012, 35% of respondents claimed the United States was among the most unfriendly or hostile countries towards Russia, and only 4% named China in this category. 16% of respondents claimed China to be one of Russia’s closest friends and allies, while only 2% placed the US in this category. The number of Russians with a "bad or very bad attitude” towards the United States grew from 29% to 38% from 2010 to 2012.

Most Russian experts understand that a U.S.-Russian alliance against China is as much of a nonstarter as a Russian-Chinese alliance against the United States. However, Moscow will have to bear in mind the dynamics of US-Chinese relations in building its policy in the Asia-Pacific region, in developing bilateral relations with Washington and Beijing, and in formulating its global strategy at large. Russia is likely to become a "swing state,” i.e. a country that has minor power relative to the two leading powers, but which is still capable of choosing one or the other alternately as a partner. Temporary coalitions may be formed with the United States on some issues, and with China on others. Diversified and multi-tiered partnerships with both the United States and China would be the best strategy for Russia. This creates favorable conditions for gaining a firmer foothold on the international arena, but each step has to be considered and calculated very carefully.

Moscow already seems to be playing this game, although politicians may not be directly aware of this. On the one hand, Russia cooperates with the United States on a number of international security issues, including arms control, Afghanistan, Iran, and the war against terrorism. The participation of Russia’s Pacific Fleet ships in the major international naval exercise RIMPAC in the summer of 2012 indicated that, despite the problems in Russian-U.S. relations, the partnership in the sphere of maintaining international security keeps developing even when the liberals’ influence in Moscow is minimal. The fact that not only Russia, but also India took part in the exercises caused China to worry.

On the other hand, Moscow has been trying to counterbalance global leadership of the USA by cooperating with China on issues relating to state sovereignty, strengthening the UN Security Council, and advocating for a multi-polar world order in which no single state is in a dominant position over all others in world affairs. The way in which veto power has been used in the UN Security Council is a telling illustration of certain overlaps in how Russia and China view the world. In 2007-2012 the right of veto was used seven times. In five of the cases, Moscow and Beijing acted together to block the resolution on Myanmar (2007), Zimbabwe (2008), and Syria (in 2011 and twice in 2012). Additionally, in 2009 Russia barred the adoption of a resolution prolonging the mandate of the UN observer mission in Georgia and Abkhazia. China abstained. The fact that joint Russian-Chinese vetoes have all been aimed at preventing international intervention into internal affairs of sovereign states indicates that the primary concern of Moscow and Beijing is retaining sovereignty as a pillar of the international political system.

As US analyst Richard Weitz has pointed out, Russia and China pursue independent but parallel policies on many global and regional development issues. Weitz believes the reason behind this lies in the fact that the main security concerns for these two states lie in different regions – in Eurasia for Russia, and in the Asia Pacific region for China. In areas of overlap (Central Asia, North Korea or the arc of instability in the Muslim world which touches the territories of Russia and China), the powers strive to avoid major contradictions, and have thus far been successful. This is a classical approach within the framework of realism.

The realists in Russia and China operate in similar ways, use similar terms, and thus can easily come to a mutual understanding. However, realism is not the only influential strand of foreign policy thought. Interaction among different schools of political thought in the United States, China and Russia will largely determine the nature of their relations. National leaders must take into account domestic political factors and, to use the term developed by Robert Putnam, play "two-level games,” i.e. interact with partners in the international arena, but bear in mind internal restrictions resulting from the overall line-up of social and political forces. Cultural and ideological factors are always at work, and they can modify constructions erected by classical realist approaches. In the United States, the liberals and neoconservatives see eye to eye in their commitment to the advancement of human rights and democracy worldwide. In China, the nationalists pepper politics with anti-American rhetoric and may easily reintroduce rhetoric regarding traditional Russian imperialist tendencies. Russia’s realists-statists, together with some nationalists, are obsessed with preserving the great power image and with resisting the liberal West at any cost, but under certain circumstances they will see a growing threat from the side of Beijing.

In the United States, the realists are having the hardest time. Advocating for human rights and democracy worldwide is part of American national identity, which is based on universal values and political institutions. This sets the US apart from other states. The system of checks and balances and the influence of civil society on politics make it impossible for any American presidential administration to act solely out of realist considerations. This, in turn, complicates the situation for Beijing in Moscow in their dealings with the USA.

Today, the way Russia perceives the USA and China can tell us more about Russia than about anything else. Vladimir Putin’s return to office and concerns over maintaining stability in the country in the spring of 2012 brought about a situation where domestic political considerations began to increasingly affect the foreign policy course. This was evident, above all, in relations with the United States and Europe. The Kremlin claimed that the West had provided backing for the Russian opposition, encouraging human rights activism and pushing for political reform, thus meddling in the Russia’s internal affairs. Arguments were made for a turn towards the Asia-Pacific region. This was primarily a policy response to the objective growth of the role of China and other Asian countries in the world. Yet Russia used this opportunity to demonstratively show the West its readiness to turn to alternative partners on the world arena.